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ABSTRACT
Republic of Belarus as an independent state appeared on the map of Europe only in 1991, af-
ter the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently, Belarus is a middle-size country on the bor-
derland between the European Union and Russia. Although politically Belarus is independ-
ent, it takes part in the political and economic unions within the post-soviet region, such as
Eurasian Economic Union. Belarus is also in the bilateral union with Russia. Therefore its
foreign policy depends on these Unions. From 1994 when the country turned from the Par-
liamentary to the Presidential Republic, an authoritarian political regime of Alexander
Lukashenko has been established: conservative in domestic issues and politically oriented to
Russia. This political factor influences Belarusian foreign policy. Belarus participated in the
Wider Europe and Eastern Neighborhood Program, being an outsider in both programs be-
cause until recently both sides, Belarus and the European Union, prioritized their own inter-
ests and did not make any political compromises. Under the influence of recent political and
economic changes in the region (protracted economic crises, escalation of Russian-Ukrainian
conflict after 2014 Maidan revolution, long-lasting Western anti-Belarus political and eco-
nomic sanctions) Belarus has started a new wave of post-soviet transition. Still being nation-
alistic and paternalistic, the country is becoming more open to the West and making steps
forward the European Union. For this reason, in 2015 most of the Western political and eco-
nomic sanctions were suspended, and the relationship between the European Union and Bel-
arus got improved. It is still unclear what will be the next steps in the EU-Belarus affairs.
However, geopolitical position of Belarus as a borderland between the East and the West
makes it necessary to promote multilateral policy and develop political, economic and cul-
tural dialogue with the European Union.
KEYWORDS: Belarus, European Union, foreign policy, bilateral relations, economy, sanctions,
dialogue.
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I. INTRODUCTION. POSSIBILITIES AND ALTERNATIVES
Republic of Belarus is an essential part of the European political mosaic, there-
fore it is impossible to ignore this country regardless of its relatively small role
in the European politics and the global affairs, as well as its contribution to the
European economic development. It is important to mention that being political-
ly closer to Russia than any other ex-Soviet republics, geographically Belarus is
situated in the center of Europe and from this criteria it is closer to the West. The
nearest neighbour country from the Belarusian border to Minsk, a capital of Bel-
arus, is Lithuania, - only 112 km, while the distance from Minsk to the Russian
border is 278 km, and to the Ukrainian border - 305 km.
Republic of Belarus has a
middle size territory in the
European perspective (207,5
sq. km): its territory is equal
to three Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania) taken to-
gether, or two thirds of the
territory of Poland, or one
third of the Ukraine. Current-
ly Belarusian population is
9.5 million (it is also more
than three Baltic states taken
together, but much less that
the population of Poland or
Ukraine). The density of the
population in Belarus is 45
persons per sq. km. Map of Belarus
Republic of Belarus was declared as a new independent state in 1991, as well
as did other ex-Soviet states. Since then, there are many media stereotypes on
Belarus in the countries of the European Union, including its neighbors Poland,
Lithuania and Latvia where the population is not aware of the actual situation in
Belarus. Some people are afraid of Belarus as a potentially dangerous country,
and some others believe that Belarus still resembles the Soviet Union. Neither
image is correct as Belarus is one of the safest country in Europe and differs
from the Soviet past in many aspects. In order to have more realistic image of
Belarus, citizens of the EU need some enlightenment on this country.
The origin of the Republic of Belarus is connected with the collapse of the
Soviet Union that was formally dissolved in December 1991. This destructive
phenomenon had launched a new stage in the history of Belarus. However, it is
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still unclear for the scholars of Eastern Europe whether the period of the post-
Soviet transformation in the eastern parts of the former Soviet empire is over or
not. Politically and economically, post-Soviet Eastern Europe (it contains Bela-
rus, Ukraine and Moldova) is still in transition. These three ex-Soviet independ-
ent republics are in search for their strong national identity, and each of these
newly independent states is still trying to build a sustainable economy and stable
political relations with their neighbors and the larger world. Each of them goes
its own way: Ukraine dreams to join the European Union, Moldova is balancing
between Russia and the European Union, and Belarus wants to strengthen its in-
dependence without entering the new unions and associations.
For this striving for the national transition to political and economic inde-
pendence, Belarus is not an exception. Although there were no Belarusian revo-
lutionary changes like in Ukraine, and no fast political shifts from western orien-
tation to Russia and vice versa like in Moldova, Republic of Belarus is not pro-
tected from any similar events in the future. Although its role in the all-European
political game looks not important from the outside, the country cannot be ig-
nored. The most important current problem for the Republic of Belarus, situated
between the two major players, European Union and Russia, is the political and
economic pressure from both sides. This is typical for a borderland country like
Belarus. On the one hand, the eastern “Big Brother” Russia is trying to strength-
en its own greatness in the ex-Soviet region and the world, while western sanc-
tions and fall of the world oil prices have posed serious challenges to the Rus-
sian desire of becoming a second world power equal to the US and to break the
uni-polar world. After Maidan revolution in Ukraine, Russia tries to keep the
rest of its neighboring countries under its dominance, and Belarus is one of such
countries. On the other hand, the European Union also experiences a difficult pe-
riod, mainly because of the migration crisis, British decision to leave the EU
(Brexit), and rejection of several Central European countries, members of the
EU, to accept new migrants and provide shelter for them. Under these circum-
stances the strengthening of the borders of the EU, including the border between
the EU and Belarus, has become a serious security issue. Making this border
strong may help to protect the EU from many unwanted migrants from the East
(Belarus is not a donor state in this migration process: it plays a role of a transi-
tion corridor for those foreigners who arrived to Russia, illegally moved to Bela-
rus for a short while with a hope to cross the EU Belarusian border and then ask
for migration status in the EU. The migrant rate in Belarus is less than 1 migrant
per 1000 Belarusian population).
These circumstances created a new challenge for the EU and opened a possi-
bility to construct the new relationship with the Republic of Belarus – more
equal than it was earlier when the EU tried to dictate its own rules to Belarus.
Now the EU started to treat Belarus friendlier that it was in the previous decades.
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However, the new conditions only gave a chance for real improvement of the re-
lationship between Belarus and the EU: nobody can guarantee whether this
chance will be realized in the practical sphere, or a new political reserve will fol-
low soon.
In what follows several issues will be discussed. First, a brief overview of the
historical past of Belarus will explain some current contradictions and peculiari-
ties in Belarusian-Russian and Belarusian-EU relationship. Second, contempo-
rary political and economic situation of the Republic of Belarus will be de-
scribed. Then several contradictions, including internal and external, will be pre-
sented, as well as some latest developments between the EU and Belarus in the
security issues. Finally, some thoughts about the future possibilities will be dis-
closed in the paper.
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND THE POST-SOVIET SITUATION
Currently, the Republic of Belarus is a borderland between Russia and Poland
from the East to the West, and between the current Lithuania and Latvia and
Ukraine from the North to the South. In other words, the country, Belarus, is a
new border between the “two Europes” – the united members of the European Un-
ion and the non-EU region (Korosteleva 2017), where Ukraine recently has be-
come an associated country with the EU. From the opposite approach, supported
by different authors (Russian, some Western and some Belarusian – belonging to
the opposition), contemporary Minsk belongs to the East and somehow opposes
the idea of “Europe”. To some extend, for purely political reasons, using the well-
known theory of Huntington (Ηantington 1996), these authors depict almost “a
clash of civilizations” situation that takes place exactly on the border between con-
temporary Belarus and Poland (Proleskovskiy 2011). However, this contemporary
view on Belarus and Minsk is politically biased: it does not reflect long and con-
tradictory history of Belarusian lands and even the history of the Republic of Bela-
rus.
The truth is that Belarusian lands have been always a borderland, however,
from the different sides. Thus, the hidden “border nature” of Belarus was masked
by several myths especially constructed and ideologically supported during the last
two centuries. This nature must be open for the public from both East and West.
The previous history of Belarus
During almost six centuries, Belarusian lands were a part of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania (GDL) and then a part of Poland (there was a feudal union between Po-
land and GDL where Poland dominated); they played a role of the “Eastern bor-
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der” in these states. That is why during the feudal wars between GDL/ Poland and
Muscovy in the 16-17 cc. the borderland Belarusian cities were often captured and
ruined by the Russian troops. During these centuries Belarusian lands belonged to
the Central-European region and shared its cultural identities. This borderland po-
sition is still similar: Republic of Belarus is situated in the geographical center of
Europe, and it is a cultural borderland.
For above-mentioned six centuries from the medieval time till the end of the 20th
c. Belarusian lands were a part of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, then Poland, then Rus-
sian Empire and then the Soviet Union (History of Belarus 2000). Western/Central
European cultural trends prevailed here until the beginning of the 19th c., then being
substituted by Russian cultural influence. Later in the 20th c., after the October revo-
lution of 1917, the Soviet/Marxist ideology and culture prevailed. Belarus as a Sovi-
et republic was totally subordinated to Moscow, and its population was treated by
the Soviet power in the same way as other Soviet republics.
Let us describe the ethnic composition and cultural peculiarities of Belarusians.
During the centuries the territory of current Belarus was populated by several eth-
nic groups, with different religious and cultural identities. Many of these groups
(for example, Tartars or Jews) spoke their own languages; however, there were no
clashes between these groups on the basis of cultural or ethnic differences: in case
of intergroup conflicts they always were inspired by the ruling powers that fol-
lowed the principle “Divide and conquer”. It is this principle of Tsarist Russia that
organized Jewish pogroms in Belarus in the beginning of the 20th century, as well
as prohibited Catholic churches after the revolt in the 1860s. As for the common
people, they peacefully lived together (or close to each other in one settlement)
without bloody conflicts, regardless of differences in their genes, religion, or cul-
tural traditions. They communicated in their everyday life, and for communication
needs they have to learn languages of each other or at least use some languages for
mutual understanding (like in the 19th c. people used Russian in the cities not being
ethnic Russians, but for practical needs because this language was dominant in the
official sphere of life).
Soviet past of Belarus
Belarusian socialist soviet state was constructed firstly in January 1, 1919. It is
hardly possible to call it “independent” as this state was formed in the fierce post-
revolutionary atmosphere of class struggle: actually, the first Belarusian state was
formed in March 1918 under the German occupation, but then, after Germans
were gone in late 1918, Bolsheviks founded a new Belarusian state and considered
it first; however, this state soon (in December 1922) became a part of the Soviet
Union and therefore lost even a chance to be independent).
There are many historical interpretations of the Soviet period of Belarus (Orlov
and Saganovich 2001; Zaprudnik 1993) with rather negative description of the
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consequences of the Soviet power for Belarusians. However, such views are one-
sided. If we shed light on the industrial development of Belarus, it will be clear
that only in the Soviet period of Belarusian history the big plants and factories
were built and the process of industrialization took place successfully, so that by
the end of the Soviet history Belarus was industrial country (in the Tsarist time it
was totally agricultural province). The same is with education: before 1917 most
people were illiterate. During the Soviet period secondary education has become
obligatory, so that majority of children graduated from seven (later eight, and fi-
nally ten years) secondary school (in the US it is called high school). The first uni-
versity was opened in Minsk in 1924, and many other institutions of higher educa-
tion – just before and after the Second World War. By the end of the Soviet period
there were 32 institutions of higher education; Belarus had its own engineers, doc-
tors, lawyers, military officers, etc. educated in the republic. Population was lit-
erate, medical treatment was free. Citizens had equal rights, according to the Soviet
Constitution, so that all ethnicities, gender were equal according to the law. Still,
there was political dictatorship of the communist party and political restrictions.
However, as during the 1950-80s a period of Cold War between the two political
systems was in function, these restrictions were officially justified by this factor of
the global counterpart of the two world systems.
Overall, Soviet legacy is contradictory: there were positive and negative conse-
quences for Belarus from this period. Thus, from the point of view of multicultur-
alism, one must agree that the Soviet rule contributed into this process. This con-
tribution can be described as both positive and negative: for the “masses” its influ-
ence was positive, while for so called “non-working, alien social elements” it was
negative (i.e. exclusive). Official Soviet ideology and the first Soviet Constitution
made people of all nations and ethnicities equal as citizens of the USSR (with the
exclusion of those without these rights). Therefore, Belarusian population en
masse was treated by the Soviet power in the same way as all the people in other
Soviet republics. It means there were no privileges as well as no special ethnic
pressure to Belarusians (Russification was not applied only to Belarusians, there-
fore, it is not a “special” method): in the 1930s Belarus experienced starvation, in the
1940s Belarusians actively participated in the war against Nazi’s occupation; in the
1930-1950s they were repressed by Stalin’s regime, and in the late 1980s they suf-
fered from the Chernobyl catastrophe under Gorbachev. However, the people of
Belarus inherited multiculturalism from their long previous experience of living
together in the same territory (History of Belarus 2000).
Actually, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (it was the official title of
the country during the Soviet time, according to the Soviet spelling) became a
model for other soviet republics to demonstrate how different nations and ethnic
groups can live and work together. Therefore, regardless of the Soviet regime, the
country, the Soviet Byelorussia, was an attractive place of living for many soviet
people from other regions. The population of the Soviet Byelorussia grew due to
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this factor (internal migration within the Soviet state), therefore it differed in eth-
nic origin, cultural traditions, and even in religion.
There were more than hundred different ethnic groups and minorities living in
this republic (http://belstat.gov.by). The majority of population consisted of ethnic
Belarusians; Russian went second, then Ukrainians and Poles come. It is interest-
ing to mention that during the Tsarist Russian time Belarus was a pale: Belarusian
cities were mainly Jewish-populated, while nobilities were Russians. Native Bela-
rusians lived in the villages and were illiterate. Even the so called native Belarus-
ian elites in the 19th c. were not of Belarusian, but of Polish origin (for this reason
there are still discussions whether Tadeusz Kościuszko, an American hero during
the American war for the independence, was Pole or Belarusian by ethnicity; as he
was born on the territory of contemporary Belarus; the same is with many Belarus-
ian poets and writers whose origin is questionable). In the Soviet period the cities
became more populated by Russians, while Jewish and Belarusian population also
resided. Because hundreds of thousand Jews were killed by Nazi in 1941-1944
(1944 – a year of Belarusian liberation by the Soviet Army from the Nazi German
occupation), percentage of the Jewish population fell down significantly; and its
number became much smaller again after the massive Jewish emigration from Bela-
rus to the USA and Israel in the 1970s. Currently, 8 out of 10 citizens of the country
(83% in 2016) are ethnic Belarusians, around 8% are ethnic Russians, Poles –
more than 3%, Ukrainians – around 2%, and the other ethnic groups are small but
numerous (http://belstat.gov.by). Overall, Belarus is a country with mainly Slavic
population.
Multicultural nature of Belarus
Belarus is a multi-religious country from the feudal time. First, Orthodox Church
came here in the 13 cc. Later, due to Polish influence, Roman-Catholic religion
became popular, and all Belarusian nobilities converted into Catholicism. From
the end of the 18th c., when Belarusian lands were under Tsarist Russian rule, Or-
thodox Church dominated. The Soviet power declared religion “an opium for the
people” and closed most churches. Still, some churches were opened and func-
tioned even under the Soviet regime (there always existed different churches in the
territory of Belarus – Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant; although the Soviet power
contributed a lot in their destruction, especially in big cities), so that people could
practice their religious rituals. In the Soviet days religion was separated from the
state, but still existed on a private level: only the so called destructive sects were
prohibited. It does not mean that the Soviet regime was neutral to religiosity; how-
ever, if someone was not a career-oriented person and did not pretend to a relative-
ly high place in the social hierarchy, he or she could attend the church without a
fear. Other people preferred to pray at home and did not express their religious be-
liefs openly. Rural dwellers could go to the church only if there was one in their
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locality). People were neutral to religiosity of each other in private life, although in
the public they seemed to be atheists. They married regardless of ethnic/ religious
background of each other.
Post-Soviet development
After the Soviet collapse in 1991 religious growth has tremendously increased: in
less than 10 years almost half of the population in Belarus has identified them-
selves as believers, and many religious denominations have appeared (Novikova,
2001). The process of religious Renaissance continued almost for two decades, it
gave rise to the Christian churches - first of all, Russian Orthodoxy under the
name of Belarusian Orthodox Church (according to surveys, around 50% of the
population identify themselves as Orthodox), then the Roman-Catholic Church
that was also recognized as a “historical legacy” of Belarus (less than 10% of the
population), then such Christian denominations as Uniate church, Old Believers,
and several Protestant denominations: Lutheran, Evangelical Christian, etc. – as
well as non-Christian religions, among them Muslims, Krishnaites, Baha’i, etc.
The rest of the population belongs to non-believers or so called unidentified group.
Currently, religious pluralism and freedom of consciousness are protected by the
Constitution. These rights – now being confirmed in a Law on religion (Law,
2002) – are in total contrast to the previous (Soviet) necessity for persons to be (or
at least to declare themselves) atheists, however, it is in line with the European re-
gional context and the fundamental human rights.
Currently, Belarus is under a double foreign influence in the religious sphere.
As a part of the two-state Union with Russia, Belarus experiences the Russian in-
fluence on the structure of religious confessions in Belarus, level and scale of re-
ligiosity of its population (relationship between the two main Christian denomina-
tions, Orthodox and Roman-Catholic, are in favor of the Russian Orthodox
Church). As a part of the globe, Republic of Belarus is under the influence of the
global factors: different religious and quasi-religious ideas are spreading beyond
the borders of nation states and the continents, international exchanges of people
and trade are the motors of growing cultural diversity and a driving force of reli-
gious multiplicity. Regardless of the political conflicts with the West (the EU and
the US sanctions), religious life in Belarus has become a part of the European and
global religious field.
The Soviet past contributed into construction of tolerance between the people
on all the issues except for official ideology and politics: it was only Marxist and
was strongly protected by the power. Other spheres of life – at least from the peri-
od after Stalin’s death in mid-1950s – were much less under control. Therefore, by
the end of the Soviet era a kind of multiculturalism was built in Belarus. It differed
greatly from any other types of multiculturalism.
First, it was limited, mainly, to everyday level of life. The important spheres
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(politics, ideology) have never been open to pluralism. Second, it was constructed
from above: no officials were interested to ask people what are their needs in plu-
ralism. It was invented to the masses as a consequence of Marxist internationalism
(although, it had some historical roots in the local traditions). Third, it was mostly
a phenomenon of the socio-cultural sphere and connected to the practical “ideolo-
gy” of communal everyday life in a village (mainly, pre-revolutionary rural com-
munities) (Kondakov 2007) However, regardless of these limitations, it helped to
keep a society in peace and develop it as culturally diverse. All inter-ethnic clashes
were punished or restricted as they contradicted the principle of Marxist proletari-
an internationalism (and therefore principle of multiculturalism as well). Principle
of internationalism, as well as prohibition of ethnic and national discrimination,
was written in the Soviet Constitution: it was an official Law. Soviet people were
socialized under these principles. In terms of Parsons (1951), internationalism and
multiculturalism (although the latter was not called by this name in those days)
were the universal norms and values of the Soviet society: they helped to integrate
Soviet people as a whole (at least it looked like that).
To some extent, multiculturalism of the previous time is a good prerequisite for
current openness of the Republic of Belarus to cooperation with different nations,
i.e. for openness of Belarus to the East and to the West.
Currently, more than twenty five years after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, the positive elements of historical legacy of Soviet multiculturalism still
exist: middle-age and old-age generations in the ex-Soviet republics know Russian
and easily use it as a means of communication in all practical issues (without any
political influence); these generations are still proud of their “soviet education”
(comprehensive and international in its content); as usual, these people do not
blame each other or other nations for political crisis and/or economic problems in
their own countries as they distinguish between the government and the people;
they can easily co-exist with people from other countries (work together, spend
free time together) because of their respect to other national cultures and ethnici-
ties (some kind of tolerance inherited from the Soviet time still exists in their con-
sciousness and their behavior), etc.
Soviet and post-Soviet multiculturalism in Belarus differs from the one in the
EU countries: it refers to the diverse but indigenous citizens of a country while in
the most EU countries multiculturalism relates to the relationship with migrants.
Having in mind this fundamental difference it does not seem relevant to apply any
Western theories of multiculturalism to Belarus.
It is not by mistake that famous Polish-British philosopher Zygmunt Bauman
called the past Soviet society “the future of Europe” having in mind the European
Union and its attempts to build a truly multicultural society within its borders
(Bauman 2011, 26). From Bauman view, there is something in the former Soviet
history that the European Union must follow – ideology and practice of “living to-
gether”. Bauman disagreed with the thesis of some EU politicians about failure of
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multiculturalism in Europe; rather, multiculturalism has to be properly developed
there in the nearest future.
From this point of view, post-Soviet Republic of Belarus can be considered as
an “exceptional island” in the great ocean of bloody ethnic conflicts in the ex-
soviet region, (currently – in Ukraine, earlier – in Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
etc.). Republic of Belarus is the only one ex-Soviet republics where ethnic con-
flicts have never taken place after/ during the destruction of the Soviet Union. All
the people who lived in the Soviet Belarus became citizens of the Republic of Bel-
arus regardless of their ethnicity, language, political and religious views. No bor-
der conflicts took place as well: Belarus is indeed a peaceful place in Europe. In
1997 Belarus was freed from the nuclear weapons and declared itself a nuclear-
free state.
As for the social structure of Belarus, most population self-identify themselves
as middle class; the proportion of the population living in poverty is relatively
small (6-7%). However, comparing with the neighboring EU countries, most of
the population do not meet the criteria of belonging to the middle class. In 2015-
2016 the standard of living declined 5% and 8% accordingly, and the purchasing
power of Belarusian currency declined as well. Age structure of Belarus is typical
for the European industrially developed countries: almost 30 % are older than 55,
and only 15% are younger than 15. Overall, around 55% belong to the age group
of 15-55 (www.belstat.gov.by). Gender structure is also typical: 45% of men and
55% of women. Belarus reached high level of gender equality, and according to
the world statistics it reached high level of development (www.hrw.org).
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPECIFICS: AN OVERVIEW
Political development
Political regime of the independent Republic of Belarus has changed twice. Origi-
nally it was established in 1991 as a parliamentary republic. This status was kept
in 1991-1994. Since 1994 it is a presidential republic with Alexander Lukashenko
as its first and only one president. Lukashenko was directly elected in July 1994.
In the 1990s he received a strong support from Russia (then under the rule of pres-
ident Yeltsin). Since 1996 Belarus is in a Union with Russia forming a suprana-
tional union of two states. Since the second decade of the twenty first century the
ties with ex-Soviet countries increased economically. First, Belarus became a
member of the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. A few years later the
Customs Union has been transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union, as Ar-
menia and Kyrgyzstan joint it.
Being totally dependent on Russian energy resources and Russian market, Bel-
arus also follows Russian foreign policy in many aspects. Belarus is a member of
CSE WORKING PAPERS 18/01 13
© 2018 CENTRO DI STUDI EUROPEI – UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SALERNO
the Collective Security Treaty Organization since the formation of this organiza-
tion, however, the military expenditures are small (a bit more than 1% of GDP).
Belarusian government keeps social security of Belarusian people as its priority;
until recently it did not accept any radical economic and political reforms in the
social sphere, and only the poor economic situation and the recent need for new
loans from the IMF or WB made the government necessary to increase the popula-
tion spending on the housing and utilities and also raise the retirement age. Unfor-
tunately, these forced economic actions did not allow the government to improve
the economic situation: the national economy is still in the critical situation, and
the improvement is expected only in the 2020th. Not only the state management,
but the economic structure and social policy of the country are in need of some
changes if Belarus wants to follow the way of sustainable development and in-
crease the living standards.
Legislative and executive powers in Belarus also need some improvement.
Belarusian parliament consists of two chambers (upper and low), however,
president has the right to approve or reject all the laws, additionally, president of-
ten issues his own decrees that seem to be implemented by all the branches of
power. Practically, his power is not limited by the parliament. Since 2004 the
amendments to the Constitution were adopted that allowed the president to stay in
office without any limitation. Lukashenko was re-elected in 1994, 2001, 2006,
2010 and 2015. All the elections except for the first one were not recognized by
the Council of Europe, the US and the European Union as free and fair. These
elections were accompanied by political protest demonstrations and disclosed the
existing practical restrictions on some political and civil freedoms (freedom of
speech and the press, assembly, etc.). Reports on violation of political rights were
prepared with the help of the Belarusian opposition and presented in the interna-
tional organizations.
Democratic restrictions in Belarus led to the fact that the European Union re-
jected to continue the Agreement on partnership and cooperation in 1997 and did
not support the desire of the Republic of Belarus to join the Council of Europe. In
the end of the 1990s programs of technical assistance for Belarus have been fro-
zen. Belarus also lost the status of a specially invited member in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Foreign affairs between Belarus, the European Union and the US have deterio-
rated even more in 1998, after the diplomatic missions were evicted from their res-
idences in Minsk, on the basis of the formally expressed by the Belarusian authori-
ties “safety concerns”. European and American diplomats left Minsk, and the offi-
cial relationships between the EU, US and Belarus dramatically deteriorated.
Some Belarusian officials and pro-government businessmen were banned from en-
tering the EU and the US. This conflict lasted for more than a decade and brought
enormous damage to Belarusian image in the world, personal image of president
Lukashenko, and even more damage to the national economy (Feduta 2005).
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The post-soviet transformation formally seems to be completed, while some
important economic and political changes still have to be done if Belarus wants to
become closer to the West. In order to have the population‘s support, the authori-
ties keep the basic medical service in Belarus free for all. Education is also free,
but those who is ready to pay also has a chance to study at the universities (actual-
ly, almost half of students pays the fees). Official unemployment level is around 1
%, while the average salaries are very moderate (in 2017 they were around 400
euro), and those who want to earn more usually move to Russia (manual workers)
or other countries (professionals). Economically, Belarus is poorer than Russia, it
is especially poor in the natural resources. Per capita income was less than in Rus-
sia estimated as $ 17.500 in 2016. According to the CIA World Factbook, Belarus-
ian GDP was around $166 billion in 2016 (https://www.cia.gov).
Economic development
The economic situation deteriorated since 2011 when the financial crisis started in
Belarus, and its economic growth declined. The inflation rates were enormously
high, level of salaries dropped more than two times. This situation initiated some
protest actions that were partly connected to the political arrests of the opposition
leaders that took part during and after the presidential election in 2010. Some of
the opposition politicians were imprisoned. In 2014 a new financial crisis erupted,
and economic growth rates turned negative.
Market economy in Belarus includes only small and middle-rage businesses,
while 80% of the economy formally belongs to the state. Economic efficiency is
very low; therefore, the state needs money from outside to keep the level of social
security in the country. Social security is the main factor to back the social order in
Belarus and the power of Lukashenko. Therefore, populist rhetoric always in
place. Lukashenko tried to consolidate his power through authoritarian means and
a centralized economic system.
The main obstacles in the improvement of Belarusian-EU relationship refer to
the political sphere, mainly – according to the official demands from the interna-
tional organizations – to the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Belarusian authorities were accused of violating the election process, as well as
political rights and freedoms of the political unions (opposition parties), rights to
gathering, meetings, etc. For more than 20 years none of political opponents of
Lukashenko takes a sit in the parliament or government (both on regional and na-
tional levels). After the important change in the Constitution in 1996, initiated by
president Lukashenko, it became formally possible for him to keep an office for a
long time. In the 21st century, due to the new amendments to the Constitution, he
can stay in office without any limitation.
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Political problems
From the view of the EU officials, Belarus constantly violate the fundamental hu-
man rights. This was the reason to impose sanctions against the Lukashenko’s au-
thoritarian regime by the European Union in early 2000s. First, the EU imposed
travel and financial restrictions for the key Belarusian officials, including Presi-
dent Lukashenko, and state-owned enterprises in 2004 because of the govern-
ment’s flagrant disregard of human rights and democratic governance principles,
especially related to the election process. The EU renewed the sanctions annually,
gradually applying them to a larger number of the officials, businessmen and
companies. On January 31, 2011, following the presidential elections (19.12.2010)
that were recognized as not free and not fair, and reacting to the repressions
against the opposition leaders after the elections, the EU introduced new sanctions
(including ban to enter the EU) against a big group of Belarusian officials related
somehow to political repressions and electoral fraud.
Similar assessments were made for the parliamentary election in 2012 (recog-
nized as not free and fair) (Analytical overview 2012). At the same time, as it has
been researched by independent analytics, opposition forces were not united and
could not resist the Lukashenko regime in promoting their candidates and expressing
their political interests. As it was mentioned in the report, prepared by the Analytical
Belarusian Center (Analytical overview 2012), “the democratic forces failed to use
the parliamentary elections to strengthen their position in the society… What is
more, it also failed to consolidate its regular supporters. With rare exceptions of
good examples of interaction of certain opposition organizations, at the parliamen-
tary elections each party has pursued its corporate interests”.
This assessment means that political regime in Belarus still had the social sup-
port, while the opposition forces were weak and unable to counterpart the current
regime. The origins of social support for Belarusian political regime are rooted in
the economic and social stability in the country that the population respects very
much. At the same time, the support for regime is connected with the people’s
frustration of growing wild market and the total poverty of the early 1990s, when
salaries became miserable, unemployment grew fast, and lack of goods and mis-
management were visible. Most population still remembers the “dashing 1990s”
and do not want these economic conditions to return back. President Lukashenko
promised to fix the economic situation and stabilize politics when being elected in
1994. He really did it in 1994-6 and for this reason he declared himself “a father of
the nation”. In 1996 he signed the political agreement with Russia on the Union of
two states to back his position in the office, and most of the population also posi-
tively assessed this Union. Republic of Belarus immediately started to use the
economic benefits of «being a close friend of Russia» (cheap oil and gas, no bor-
der control between two states, easy labor migration to Russia, etc.).
This positive economic situation lasted all the years when Russian president
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Yeltsin was in office. After Putin took this office in 2000, he began to build the
bilateral relationship with the focus on Russian interests and cut the Belarusian
benefits. It reflected in the economic agreements within the Customs Union and
later the Eurasian Economic Union: Russia has much more preferences than Bela-
rus or other members of these unions. In particular, since 2010 the gas and oil
prices were raised for Belarus, so that Belarus lost all the previous economic bene-
fits. On the contrary, current Belarus has a huge debt to Russian corporation
GAZPROM because the prices are too high for Belarus to pay them in full. Bela-
rusian national economy is too weak and not reformed. The labor productivity is
low; the quality of economic products is low, so that it is difficult to sell them
abroad. Belarusian economic “effects” were related to Russian natural resources,
and when these resources became not available the Belarusian economic declined.
In the last years there were several so called “gas scandals” between Russia and Bel-
arus when they could not negotiate the prices for the next year until the eve of the
New Year, and Russian energy supply to Belarus was decreased several time. Since
2016 Russia claimed that Belarus began to accumulating the national debt for pay-
ing below the agreed price for Russian gas. By April 2017 this debt reached $740
million. Russia decided to reduce its export of crude oil to Belarus as a result of
this unpaid debt since the end of 2016. In April 2017, when Belarus agreed to pay
its gas debt, Russia restored the flow of crude oil. Russia has agreed to refinance
external debt of Belarus for the sum of $700 million (Gazeta.ru 2017). In June
2017 during the meeting of presidents of Belarus and Russia in Moscow,
Lukashenko stressed that regardless of the above-mentioned scandals the two
countries are in close union and their relations are strong.
Usually the “gas conflicts” ended up quickly in favor for Russia. Belarusian
population did not suffer for long because of these clashes. However, as Belarus-
ian debt increased dramatically, Belarus needs the new foreign loans to serve the
debt. In parallel to gas scandals, after the start of the EU sanctions against Russia,
there were “food scandals”. Belarus initiated the trade schemes of sale and resale
of food from the EU to Russia replacing the EU food labels by Belarusian labels.
Russian authorities founded and exposed these schemes charging Belarus for food
substitution. The country did not gain benefits as expected. Therefore a search for
foreign loans continued. Notwithstanding the foreign financial assistance, Belarus-
ian economy continues to struggle under the weight of high external debt servicing
payments and trade deficit.
President Lukashenko is trying to balance the economic relationship with Rus-
sia focusing on the Belarusian political and military support to Russia. When Rus-
sia does step forward to Belarus, Lukashenko also makes positive steps to please
Russia (for example, he agreed to buy Russian materials and invite Russian pro-
fessionals to build the new Atomic station in Belarus, Belarusian military troops
are a part of the military defensive union with Russia, and the like). However,
there is an opinion that Putin stopped the economic benefits for Belarus because
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Lukashenko did not support Russia in several important political issues. First, it
happened in relation to Georgia during the military clashes between Russia and
Georgia. Lukashenko did not cut the official relationship with Georgia and did not
recognize political independence of the two autonomous republics belonging to
Georgia but declared independent (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). This conflict
took place in 2008. When air transportation was cut between Georgia and Russia,
Belarus built a “bridge” opening new several air roots between these states via
Minsk.
Second, visible political contradiction between Russia and Belarus is the as-
sessment of Russian-Ukrainian conflicts after Maidan revolution (2014), and espe-
cially their results (self-declaration of Lugansk and Donetsk republics within the
Ukraine, and shifting the Crimea to Russia). Belarus did not support these actions.
Belarus demonstrated “a political distance” from Russia: Republic of the Crimea
was not recognized as a Russian region, citizens of Belarus were “not recom-
mended” to travel to the Crimea, all kinds of transportation to the Crimea were
cut, while the Ukrainian refugees were welcome in Belarus (now their number is
more than hundred thousand people), etc.
When Russian-Ukrainian conflict looked totally unsolvable Belarus offered it-
self as a platform for the multilateral peaceful negotiations. Minsk has become a
place for multilateral discussions between two conflicting countries, two self-
declared republics, and two main countries of the European Union, Germany and
France. The so called “Minsk platform” was recognized as “workable” by all the
sides. All the above-mentioned sides met each other several times in Minsk. The
important “Minsk agreements” were signed by all sides (however, these agree-
ments were not implemented into the reality, and until now this military conflict is
not resolved).
After president Lukashenko offered Minsk as a platform for peaceful negotia-
tion of all the involved parties, the European Union softened its position towards
Belarus. On this basis, started from 2015, EU attitudes toward the Republic of
Belarus had changed. Since 2016 the anti-Belarusian sanctions were softened and
then stopped (they are still not totally abolished, but temporary out of function).
Lukashenko made new steps toward the EU in autumn of 2015 when he per-
formed some actions that the EU demands as conditions for further improvement
of the relationship with Belarus. Thus, in Autumn of 2015, before the new presi-
dential elections, Lukashenko released the political prisoners including Nikolai
Statkevich, presidential candidate in 2010 (they were accused in criminal actions
and violation of order while in reality they were political prisoners demanding free
and fair elections). On October 11, 2015 new elections took place. Regardless of
existence of several candidates, Lukashenko again was elected by the majority of
voters. However, there were no protest actions and nobody was arrested, and the
EU accepted the election results.
Following these political steps made by Lukashenko, and keeping in mind the
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aim of strengthening the level of security in Europe, in October 2015 the EU tem-
porarily postponed most of sanctions against Belarus. This situation was kept for
four months. During this period Lukashenko did not allow Russian military base
on the territory of Belarus and kept neutrality in Russian conflicts with Ukraine.
Belarus did not stop economic relations with Ukraine – its economic partner from
the East.
In winter of 2016, the EU decided to stop sanctions against most of Belarusian
officials and keep them only against 4 military officials that were accused in dis-
appearance of people in Belarus in 1999-2000. The United States suspended most
of its sanctions against Belarus at the same time with the EU. However, the US
always demanded that Lukashenka’s government should genuinely respect and
protect citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and stressed the necessity of
international monitoring of this situation in Belarus before the final decision on
lifting the sanctions.”
The situation remained positive in 2017. After the successful parliament elec-
tions in September 2016 that were recognized by the EU and assessed in positive,
there is a chance that all sanctions will be banned soon.
Internal problems
Meantime, there are several internal contradictions and problems in Belarus, and
many of them are usually under the critical attitude from the European Union. Ac-
cording to the regular sociological monitoring of the situation, the most important
internal problem is a deterioration of economic situation. Economic decline may
cause a significant decrease in the standard of living of the population. As Belarus
does not have natural resources, it suffers from the total oil and gas dependency
from Russia. This dependency was one of the reasons of Union between Belarus
and Russia in the 1990s. On the basis of this Union, Belarus had cheap prices for
gas and oil and even sold abroad the oil products made from Russian resources.
Currently, under the economic crisis conditions, Russia does not want to make
preferences for Belarus. Therefore, Belarus has enormous debts for the foreign or-
ganizations and/or countries (on average, more than $1000 per person), it suffers
from lack of for resources, and still totally depends on Russia. There were attempts
to diversify the supply of these resources (Azerbaijan, Venezuela), however, the
cost was much higher that from Russia. Following the Russian influence and using
the Russian loan, Belarus started to build the atomic station aiming to provide en-
ergy for the country and even sell it abroad to the EU neighbors. However, the
place for this construction is not far from the border with Lithuania (in Grodno re-
gion). Therefore, this country constantly issues protests against this construction
and demands to arrange political boycott against Belarus (Lithuanian Seim 2017);
the border countries already declared that they would never buy energy from Bela-
rus in the future. It means that the new atomic station will not improve the energy
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situation for Belarus and its economy: there will be no possibility to sell the exces-
sive energy to the neighbor countries. Therefore, Lukashenko is searching for
money everywhere. He seems to balance between the East and the West because
the current political regime needs external financial sources to survive and keep
the social order in the country. At the same time new Russian conditions for
providing new loans are tough, they still relate to the political conditions, and may
decrease Lukashenko power. Therefore trade is a current driving force for Belarus-
ian political regime, and the EU is an important trade partner for Belarus. Russia is
a main partner in foreign trade: more than 50% of exported goods, especially oil,
natural gas, and metals, are from Russia, and 40% of imported goods. European
Union keeps a second place in the Belarusian commodity turnover: its share in
Belarusian export is more than 30% and more than 25% of import. Belarus has the
most developed economic ties with such European countries as the UK, Nether-
lands, Germany, Italy, Belgium as well as Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Czech
Republic, i.e. both with the old and new EU member states. Currently, in 2017,
due to the hard economic conditions, president Lukashenko is ready for any
agreements with any country from the East and West and for economic conces-
sions if they may help to keep Belarus independent and current political regime
stable.
Russia is able to give a new loan to Belarus, however the unpaid Belarusian
debt reached the enormous level: according to media sources, it is more than 1000
USD per citizen (Gazeta.ru 2017). If Russia would not introduce to Belarus the
internal Russian prices for energy, Belarusian economy would not overcome this
economic crisis. And there are no chances that Russia would do this.
New strict conditions from the world creditors (World Bank and International
Monetary Fund) pushed Lukashenko to increase the population’s payment for util-
ities and increased pension age in 2016. These acts were not welcome by the
population; however, the social situation is still tolerable to the authorities.
Another kind of the problem is a situation with the civil society in Belarus. It is
rather weak: it has small size because not many people are involved in any public
activities beyond the official (regime sponsored) activities. People are afraid of
such activism, and many lost their hopes for better life and democracy, while the
rest are simply focusing on survival issues and not interested in the public life at
all. Economic situation influences public opinion and behavior more than civil so-
ciety (there is a wording: refrigerator is stronger than TV, i.e. wellbeing is more
influential than the official propaganda). Still, small civil society exists regardless
of hard conditions: it always nominates candidates for presidential election and us-
es electoral campaign for anti-Lukashenko propaganda. The civil society groups
include part of academic intellectuals, other groups of professionals, all those in the
market – all together 25-30% max. Almost all of them will not politically act as long
as possible as there are legitimate tools to punish them (due to the laws). There are
small opposition political parties and youth sections among them. Additionally, the
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legal opposition media exist as well (news agency BelaPAN, for example). Belarus-
ian journalist and writer (employed at foreign news agency) Svetlana Aleksievich
became a Nobel winner in 2015.
Finally, the unsolved political problem of democratization and economic re-
forms in Belarus resulted in the lack of viable alternatives to the present political
system and the current president. Western subsidies for opposition leaders are not
enough to resist Lukashenko, and Russia would hardly support any opposition
candidate if he would be against the Russian military bases and full cooperation
between Russia and Belarus. And all the opposition candidates stand against such
bases. Only a potential candidate loyal to Russia might easily find Russian support
for his victory in Belarusian election. However Lukashenko does not plan to leave
the office himself and keeps the relationship with Russia as his priority. Probably,
the most important factor to back the current political regime is the population that
still trust Lukashenko and support his rule at least on the level of 50%, while the
proportion of his direct opponents is much smaller (between 10% and 20%). The
rest of the Belarusian population is neutral or not interested in politics at all: they
will be calm at any political regime if their private interests are not involved.
Belarusian state elites around Lukashenko are weak as he selects only those in-
dividuals who obeys him. They do not have their own initiatives and creativity to
reform the country. Russian support depends on Lukashenko’s loyalty to Russia as
well.
IV. BELARUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Political disagreements between Belarus and the EU
There are several issues that divide Belarus and the European Union politically.
These issues relate primarily to the restriction of democratic procedures and viola-
tion of human rights, and to the border control.
Belarus is the only one European state that still remains the capital punishment
as its law. The Human Rights Watch stated in the annual (2016) report
(www.hrw.org), that “the death penalty remains in use. Officials pressure and ar-
rest human rights activists and critics on spurious charges. Authorities regularly
harass independent and opposition journalists. Legislative amendments further re-
stricted freedom of expression, in particular Internet freedom”. The European Un-
ion put an issue of death penalty ban as important condition for the improvement
of its relationship with Belarus. In 2015 Belarus expressed its readiness to discuss
this issue with the Council of Europe, however, death penalty is still in function.
A second issue relates to the arrests and harassment of human rights defenders
and government critics. Belarusian authorities interfere with the work of inde-
CSE WORKING PAPERS 18/01 21
© 2018 CENTRO DI STUDI EUROPEI – UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SALERNO
pendent and opposition journalists and bloggers. Law enforcement officials inten-
sified prosecutions of independent freelance journalists for cooperation with un-
registered foreign media. There were several cases against journalists, according to
the Belarusian Association of Journalists. All cases resulted in significant fines for
the journalists. Freedom of association is also violated in several aspects. Thus, the
authorities continue to enforce legislation criminalizing involvement in an unregis-
tered organization, and at the same time arbitrarily deny registration to and attempt
to dissolve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The EU programs for Belarus and Eastern European region
At the same time, Belarusian authorities appeared to be seeking a political rap-
prochement with European governments and institutions, and hosted a number of
high-level visits. This means that Belarusian government started new steps toward
the European Union wishing to improve the relationship. Among the discussed is-
sues are migration, regional conflicts, border control, etc. These issues are con-
stantly in the agenda for political discussions: «Today’s European Union faces
years of financial crisis, stagnant growth, rising levels of unemployment and ille-
gal migration» (Korosteleva 2017). Currently, more than one million new mi-
grants already live in the EU, and even more migrants want to follow this way and
enter the EU. Non-stop unlimited and uncontrolled migration has become a seri-
ous challenge to the EU, especially taking into account terrorist attacks already
happened in France and Belgium. Therefore, security has become a core value.
For strengthening the borders and preventing the waves of migrants that have no
legal basis to claim refugee status, the EU tries to sign the agreements on migra-
tion with the neighbor countries and keep the borders safe and secure. Actually
this goal was important for many years, therefore, the EU established several spe-
cial programs of cooperation with its neighboring countries (mainly, the Mediter-
ranean and Eastern European states).
The 2004-2007 EU enlargements have brought Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and especially Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the EU borders. Therefore
issues of bilateral security and stability have become more important, and the spe-
cial program was designed aimed to solve this issue. The EU started the European
Neighborhood Policy in 2004 and developed different means to reach out and to
shape the outside by its own standards. This included several financial and policy
instruments focusing on different aspects of regional development in Eastern Eu-
rope. Some of them were more popular, some failed soon.
Program of Eastern Partnership (EPP) was established in 2008. A joint declara-
tion was signed in Prague in 2009. It included 6 ex-soviet states: Belarus, Moldo-
va, and Ukraine that have borders with the EU, and Armenia, Georgia and Azer-
baijan in the Asian region. Eastern partnership program put forward ideas for en-
hancing the EU's relationship with the region, including in the field of home af-
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fairs. It was officially based on a commitment to the principles of international law
and fundamental values – democracy, the rule of law, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms (Freyburg et al. 2011). It also encompassed support for a market
economy, sustainable development and good governance. In the future these six
countries were viewed as friendly allies to the EU. Therefore Program of Eastern
Partnership had two sides: political and economic, and economic funds depend on
political steps made by any of the ex-soviet republics toward the EU requirements.
This program was successful for the EU in many aspects: soon the so called “col-
ored revolutions” took place in Ukraine and Moldova that led to radical changes in
their foreign policy and attitude to Russia. Georgia got rid of Russian influence
even before joining Eastern Partnership Program. Therefore, in 2014 the EU
signed the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and the
European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the “European perspective”
of these three post-soviet countries. In 2017 the EU opened the border for Ukraini-
ans (cancelled visas) and promised to discuss the issue of Ukrainian inclusion into
the EU in the future (however, according to the Eastern Partnership strategy, the
EU is unlikely to accept these states in the near years, this is a future perspective
for them).
The situation with Belarus differs greatly. Eastern Partnership Program did not
meet Lukashenko’s expectations, it was poorly funded for Belarus: practically, Eu-
ropean money went only to the projects on strengthening the border control and
not to the economic development of Belarus. No political benefits were provided
for Belarus as well (for example, visa cost for Belarus is 60 euro, while for other
countries in the region it is 30 Euro or free). Negative evaluation of presidential
campaigns (2006, 2010) as well as sanctions did not positively influence the rela-
tionship with the EU. Therefore, although Belarus joint the Eastern Partnership
program, this program was not actively supported by Lukashenko. He did not
change political priorities of Belarus and did not make a turn from Russia to the
EU, like the above-mentioned three republics in Eastern Partnership Program. On
the contrary, Lukashenko increased security for his regime and prevented any op-
position attempts to start the “color revolution” in Belarus.
However, the EU political goals in EPP did not take into account the interests
of eastern European countries and understand them as equal partners: the “other-
ing” or differentiation of Eastern European countries was interpreted as deviation,
if they did not accept the EU values and norms. As Korosteleva explained, the EU
failed in «imagine a new social order which would give a relational value to the
Other» (Korosteleva 2017). National priorities of Belarus as expressed by Presi-
dent Lukashenko (including its close relationship with Russia) have never been
accepted by the EU. In the official EU-Belarus talks until recently (i.e. the Russia-
Ukraine deterioration of relations in 2014) Belarus in general was treated as a “a
bad guy” who still had to provide security on the EU borders and accept the EU
interests.
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The EU always interfere ex-soviet space, supporting some countries and isolat-
ing others. With the spatial imaginaries of European Neighborhood (ENP), the EU
is itself actively engaged in re-configuring borders on its external frontiers and be-
tween post-Soviet states. It has been doing this in many ways: first, by advancing a
regional cooperation agenda that targets national modernization and convergence
to the EU norms; second, by developing a new security area that aims at stopping
the undocumented immigration and addressing other perceived threats; and, third,
through an implicit policy of creating a buffer zone between the EU and the Rus-
sian Federation’s direct sphere of influence (Titarenko 2016). These different ob-
jectives are contradictory and often problematic – they contain both progressive
elements of potential regional partnerships but also exclusionary and discriminato-
ry aspects (BelaPAN 2012). Finally, and with a view to future scenarios of deeper
regional cooperation, there are discontinuities between domestic political agendas
in neighboring states and the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, especially in the form of
border-transcending tasks set out in the 2003 Wider Europe document.
By now ENP remains unfulfilled because a unilateral EU policy does not work
similar in regard to different countries. Currently the ENP supported traditional
western geopolitical thinking, – EU-centrism while eastern states (including Bela-
rus) wanted more equality in the relationship with the EU. This equality can be a
good platform for further improvement of the relationship between Belarus and
the EU.
Current changes in the EU-Belarus relations
The EU has some own interests for the improvement the relationship with Bela-
rusian regime. In the nearest past the EU planned to construct anti-Russian ring
from the former soviet republics that exist on the borders of Russia. European
Partnership program included 6 republics: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Five out of six countries got better conditions for travel-
ing to the West and 4 experienced some kind of revolutions (except for Azerbaijan
and Belarus as the most conservative and most authoritarian among six). Now
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia follow Western way and considered more demo-
cratic and liberal. Armenia made step back and joint Eurasian Union (due to Rus-
sian financial support and due to the Nagorny Karabach where Russia latently
support Armenia against Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan went its own (Asian) way – also
independent from Russia. Only Belarus was a failure of the EU, regardless of
many years of sanctions imposed on Belarus: they did not help the EU to reach
their goals in the EU – Belarus relationship (European 2012).
The current interests of the EU in the improvement the relations with Belarus
are more pragmatic: EU does not demand Belarus any more to follow the Europe-
an values. The EU pre-conditions included only free and fair presidential election
and release of political prisoners. Lukashenko met both conditions in 2015. More
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than that: he made first step forward the EU when he did not recognize Crimea as
Russian part in 2014, did not drop relations with Ukraine later on (even increased
trade) and provided a political space for peaceful negotiations between Russia-
Ukraine-Donetck – Lugansk under the supervision of Germany and France (Nor-
mandy format). All parties met in Minsk several times and elaborated agreements
to stop shutting and make special conditions for Donetck and Lugansk as parts of
the Ukraine. As a result of several meetings in Minsk, the so called Minsk Agree-
ments were achieved and recognized as a Road Map for solving the crisis. How-
ever neither Ukraine nor Russia performed according to these agreements, and sit-
uation is still not fixed. Nevertheless, Belarus tries to follow this neutrality (as well
as it was earlier when Northern Ossetia and Abkhazia were not recognized as in-
dependent).
The EU also wants to strengthen the EU-Belarus borders as through this border
people from Russia can try to enter the EU (as people do on the Russian-Finnish
border). So, terrorism and migration are the reasons behind EU, as well as desire
to make Russia weak if Belarus, its ally, will play this game (in-between). Still, no
real improvement in conditions for visas have been made (they were only prom-
ised and discussed), and citizens of Belarus still pay 60 euro per visa. Only sanc-
tions from Lukashenko and other Belarusian authorities were waved (terminated).
New loan was promised by the West and partly provided, but it was not enough
for economic needs of Belarus. Further conditions for getting western loans are
not acceptable for Lukashenko (they can turn to social explosion). On the other
side, Russia also agrees to provide further financial support under some political
conditions (military bases, higher oil price, etc.) That is why this balancing of Bel-
arus between the West and East is not stable, it is uncertain which preference can
be made in the future. Still, as the EU does not accept any “president-for-life”,
Lukashenko may be afraid of too close relations with the West – either political or
economic. For this reason, in the last years, Lukashenko developed good relations
with China: this country received economic preferences, and several Chinese in-
vestments into Belarusian economy was made. For China, Belarus is a part of
Chinese bridge to the West (a part of the “new Silk Road”). It is quite possible that
Belarus (like Russia) would prefer to develop its closer relationship with China in
case of more obstacles or difficulties in the relationship with the European Union.
With the 2014 Ukrainian crisis in mind, the important question can be raised
why Belarusian authoritarian regime being afraid of Maidan, still keep very close
ties with Ukraine and do not support Russia in the conflicts with Ukraine. The
same attitude took place earlier in regard to Georgia and its conflict with Russia.
Although such attitude to Georgia and Ukraine may negatively influence Russian-
Belarusian relationship, they are in place. Lukashenko runs this kind of foreign
policy to demonstrate “political independence” to all neighbors, and at the same
time there are no real changes in the EU-Belarus and the Belarus-Russia political
relationship. Belarus is a close Russian partner in political and economic relation-
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ship, while Belarus wants to become closer economic partner with the EU and all
other countries to make the economic situation in Belarus more stable (have new
loans, investments, make new trade agreements, etc.).
Recently great changes in the EU-Belarus relations were achieved. There were
objective reasons for these changes. First, the objective trade needs made Belarus
more important as a mediator between the EU and Russia. Also, after imposing
sanctions on Russia the EU would appreciate to include Belarus into its trade rela-
tionship on a higher level and partly substitute Russia (indeed, following this strat-
egy, Belarus re-sold many EU products to Russia).
Second, it is a new political situation in the region, related to Ukraine (since
February 2014) and later, when the EU-Russia relations became worse because of
Crimea issue (March 2014), and sanctions were imposed on Russia. Since 2014,
Belarus played a role of political mediator between Russia and Ukraine and initi-
ated the so called Minsk talks and then Minsk peaceful agreements aimed to stop
military confrontation in Eastern Ukraine. Although this initiative did not bring the
final decision to the situation in Ukraine, it helped to keep it under the control.
Leaders of Germany and France visited Minsk to take part in the multilateral ne-
gotiations between all the involved parties (so called meeting in Normandy For-
mat) in 2015. These peaceful steps by Lukashenko were positively accessed by the
EU leaders.
Third, Belarus somehow demonstrated “a political distance” from Russia: Cri-
mea was not recognized as a Russian region, citizens of Belarus were “not rec-
ommended” to travel to Crimea, all kinds of transportation to the Crimea were cut,
Ukrainian refugees were welcome in Belarus, etc. (currently, hundreds of Ukraini-
ans live in Belarus).
Last, but not least. Belarusian political regime made steps forward to the EU
demands related to elections and prisoners. In 2015 all political prisoners were re-
leased, several candidates participated in 2015 presidential election were freed,
and nobody was arrested as the result of new election. Lukashenko was recognized
a winner again, however, the EU accepted the results.
To summarize the new interpretation of political situation.
a) Belarus is situated exactly on the borderland between Russia and the EU,
it needs good relationship with both West and East. Thus, Russia is a main partner
in foreign trade (more than 50% of exported goods, especially oil, natural gas, and
metals, are from Russia, and 40% of imported goods). European Union keeps a
second place in the Belarusian commodity turnover: its share in Belarusian export
is more than 30% and more than 25% of import. Belarus has the most developed
economic ties with such EU members as the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy,
Belgium among the “old EU states” as well as Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and
Czech Republic among the former Eastern European (socialist) states.
b) Further strengthening of the economic ties with the EU is of great im-
portance: currently the EU has become the main economic partner in economic
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services (more than 50% of Belarusian profits go from transportation of goods be-
tween the West-East), where Russia holds only 25% of total amount. This tenden-
cy is growing during the last 10 or more years, therefore, Belarus is highly inter-
ested in good relationship with the EU. Keeping Russia as its geopolitical priority,
Belarusian authorities want to diversify their economic ties with Russia and in-
crease commodity turnover with the EU states. The authorities badly need finan-
cial support from both East and West, as economic stability is the basis of keeping
the current political order untouched.
c) Contemporary Belarusian foreign policy can be viewed as more bilateral
than earlier. Lukashenko is afraid to loose independence and therefore tries to keep
distance from Russia in such issues as military bases, Russian business in Belarus,
etc.
d) Lukashenko makes steps toward the EU and performs actions that the EU
demands as conditions for improvement of the relationship. Lukashenko released
the political prisoners in 2015, before the new election. The new elections took
place further and their results (election of Lukashenko) were recognized by the
EU.
e) Following these political steps made by Lukashenko, and keeping in mind
the aim of strengthening the level of security in Europe, in October 2015 the EU
temporarily postponed most of the sanctions against Belarus. This situation was
kept for four months. During these 4 months Lukashenko did not allow Russian
military base on the territory of Belarus and kept neutrality in relationship with
Ukraine. Belarus did not stop economic relations with Ukraine – its economic
partner from the East.
The United States suspended most of its sanctions against Belarus at the same
time. However, the US always demanded that Lukashenka’s government should
genuinely respect and protect citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and
stressed the necessity of international monitoring of this situation in Belarus before
the final decision on lifting the sanctions.” In February 2016, the EU decided to
stop sanctions against most of Belarusian officials and keep them only against 4
military officials that are accused in disappearance of people in Belarus in 1999-
2000. The situation was carefully analyzed again after the parliament election in
September 2016, and the overall assessment was positive However, the principal
changes in the composition of Belarusian parliament were not made, because only
few opposition members were elected.
Migration, border security and border control
The concept of European Neighborhood has been a central element in policies of
EU enlargement and the rearrangement of the Union’s external relations with the
neighbor-states. Belarus was on a periphery of implementation of this concept,
although formally it was a part of it. European Union is trying to maintain a
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meaningful leading role in the world and construct a new style of international
relations in which partnership will contribute to a transcendence of previous tra-
ditional politics. Through this lens the EU tries to give the neighbor-states a new
sense of (geo)political identity and include them into the sphere of the EU influ-
ence.
The EU’s concept of Neighborhood was based on the premise that the EU has
exportable values, norms and models of social development that can assist in the
social transformation of neighboring states. At the same time, post-Soviet trans-
formation has not only necessitated a renegotiation of state–society relations but
also led to a comprehensive reconfiguration of Soviet-era political, economic and
social ties. Belarus also changed the state-society relations, at least on their sur-
face, but escaped the deep transformation. In Belarus there were no conflicts be-
tween the Soviet legacies and emerging nation-building strategies the new political
regime introduced, while the EU instruments of imposing the so called European
values and models were not accepted. As a result, there were no cases of resur-
gence of any regional or ethnic conflicts frozen during the Soviet time.
On a practical level, Belarusian state itself was aimed to secure its borders with
the EU, and this desire coincided with the EU intention to strengthen the same
border for its own interests – protection from unwanted migrants (as well as bor-
der control for traditional reasons – checking passports, goods, stop the drug and
weapon illegal trade, etc.). There was no visible goal to finalize the borders of
post-Soviet states or the borders between them and the EU; actually, this process
by no means is completed. However, in case of Belarus there were no mutual de-
mands or clashes related the borders. In general, migration is a part of internation-
alization of regional political contexts on the ex-soviet space and beyond. Migra-
tion relates also to the European and Eurasian integration attempt in the post-
Soviet region. For Belarus, migration is a border-control issue because Belarus is
like a transit zone for migrants from Russia to the EU. Therefore, improvement of
the EU-Belarus relations include the issue of migration.
The EU tried to implement its common instrument of securing the border by
signing the Readmission Agreements. While such agreements were already signed
with other post-Soviet states, Belarus still did not sign it because the EU condi-
tions were not balanced and not favored Belarus: the country had to promise to ac-
cept all migrants that crossed the EU-Belarusian border back to Belarus regardless
of their nationality and country of origin. As most of the illegal migrants crossing
this border are not citizens of Belarus, the readmission agreement might create a
problem of dealing with such migrants. Therefore, Belarusian Interior Ministry has
some obstacles for readmission. It is necessary to discuss, who can provide the
funds for temporary migrants camps in Belarus? Who will fund their transporta-
tion to home countries? Belarus does not have readmission agreements with most
of the countries, so that it might be difficult to deal with illegal migrants in the fu-
ture.
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For several years the EU took readmission agreement as a precondition for
talks on visa facilitation for citizens of Belarus. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
noted, Belarusian officials «are ready to sign the visa facilitation agreement. How-
ever, the European Union links visa facilitation agreements with readmission
agreements» (Belarus’ MFA 2017).
Finally, by the end of 2017, the positive talks between the experts of the Euro-
pean Union and the Belarusian Interior Ministry were finalized, and issues of re-
admission and visa facilitation were harmonized. The documents can be signed in
2018 (MIA, 2017). According to the view of Aleksei Begun, Head of the Citizen-
ship and Migration Department of the Belarusian Interior Ministry, the readmis-
sion agreement can be signed in early 2018 and then ratified: «Despite the firm
position of the EU experts, Belarus insisted on a transitional period for non-
readmission of third-country nationals». (Belarus, EU, 2017). This decision is im-
portant for Belarus because of the necessity to prepare the infrastructure for ac-
commodating illegal migrants, strengthen the logistics support for the interior bod-
ies and border services. Belarus also needs to get ready for a change in the number
of people that the EU may send to Belarus under the readmission obligations to be
further sent to their home countries. the international technical assistance project,
which will require some €7 million, envisages a number of events. The project is
implemented by the EU with the help of the IOM Office in Belarus jointly with
the interior bodies, border services, and a number of migration organizations. The
project, scheduled for implementation in 2017-2022, envisages the construction of
centers for illegal migrants both at the interior bodies and border services, infra-
structure, vehicles for the transportation of illegal migrants, and information cen-
ters.
Therefore, there is a hope for further improvement of the EU-Belarus relation-
ship and there are practical tools and instruments for the implementation of the
agreed policies in the nearest years. When it happens it will be more options and
chances for citizens of Belarus to communicate with the people from the European
Union. It may means the end of political isolation of Belarus in Europe and the
world
With the 2014 Ukrainian crisis in mind, the question can be raised why Bela-
rusian authoritarian regime being afraid of Maidan, still keep very close ties with
Ukraine and do not support Russia in the conflicts with Ukraine. The same took
place earlier in regard to Georgia and its conflict with Russia. Although such atti-
tude to Georgia and Ukraine may strongly influence Russian-Belarusian relation-
ship, they are in place. Lukashenko runs this kind of foreign policy to demonstrate
“political independence” to all neighbors, and at the same time there are no real
changes in the EU-Belarus and the Belarus-Russia relationship. Belarus is a close
Russian partner in political and economic relationship, while Belarus wants to be-
come closer economic partner with the EU and all other countries to make the
economic situation in Belarus more stable (have new loans, investments, etc.).
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V. CONCLUSION
Belarusian attempts to “become a bridge” between the two sides, the EU and Rus-
sia, keep political neutrality and non-involvement into the regional conflicts can be
viewed from the EU perspective as positive. In contemporary global world it is
clear that decisions for the conflict resolution and for economic crises can be
found only through the peaceful dialogues and international compromises. The
global experience proves the so called “humanitarian bombing and democratic
coups” lead only to exacerbate the problems.
In March 2016 Belarus declared that the visa regime will be ease for citizens
from the countries without serious migration problems. Indeed, currently foreign-
ers from 80 states can visit Belarus without visa for a week period of time. The EU
understands that Republic of Belarus can be neutral to the EU (not an ally, howev-
er), and it is in bilateral interests to support a fruitful dialogue with Belarus. Oth-
erwise Belarus can join Russia totally in all geopolitical issues, and the EU cannot
be able to find instruments of influencing Belarus in the future. Therefore, im-
provement of the relationship between the EU and Belarus is visible now.
There are issues related to the European Union that may prevent positive steps
forward in Belarus-EU ties. It is mainly the threat of NATO for the whole region,
especially for Russia, and therefore it is considered in the same way as a threat for
Belarus in Minsk. As a reply to the new deployment of the US troops in Poland,
Russia and Belarus arrange military trainings not far from the EU border, and this
fact is considered by Poland and Lithuania as a «threat for security from Russia
and Belarus» (MFA Belarus 2017). They express this attitude in their official
statements, regardless of the explanation of the opposite sides that it is only a retal-
iatory act. Keeping the rhetoric of the Cold War in the foreign affairs, it is hardly
to expect the improvement in the relationship between the EU and Belarus (espe-
cially between Republic of Belarus and its neighboring EU states Lithuania, Po-
land, Latvia). The only way out is increasing the level of trust, mutual respect of
the national interests of the opponents, and their desire to cooperate rather than
fight with each other.
Depending on further improvement of the relationship between Belarus and the
EU, there are at least three potential options for their future. The most positive op-
tion is the full improvement of the relationship between Belarus and the EU. On
this way forward, in October 2016 the EU launched a Mobility Partnership with
Belarus to ensure a better management of migrant flows (EU launches 2016). Sim-
ilar mobility agreements have been already signed with many countries of Eastern
Europe. Belarus will continue the negotiation of such agreement in all details in
the nearest future. Currently Belarus has the highest number of Schengen visas per
capita in the world issued by the EU countries – more than 752 thousand in 2015.
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At the same time 140 thousand citizens of Belarus got resident permissions (most
of them from Poland) and left Belarus. The future agreement may improve man-
agement of migrants and enhance cooperation of experts on migration in Europe.
The agreement on readmission to be probably signed in 2018 will further improve
the EU-Belarus relationship as well.
The other option is the opposite: rejection of further agreements and freezing
relationship between Belarus and the EU. This option is in line with the Cold War
strategy. In case of worsening the EU-Russia relations Belarus may be involved in
this political conflict. Finally, there is an option to keep the relationship as they are
and try to maneuver between the EU and Russia. This option is temporary, as Bel-
arus has to develop positive ties with both East and West, and for this aim the
country needs in good (rather than neutral) relationship with the EU – the im-
portant economic partner and significant political power on the global level.
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